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Uniform Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: The Answer to 




This Note addresses whether there should be an arbitration and 
mediation section added to both the Uniform Athlete Agent Act (UAAA),1 
and Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA)2 to establish a 
uniform dispute resolution process for dealing with unscrupulous acts of 
athlete agents.  This issue is distinctive because while all four professional 
sports leagues’ players associations have specific arbitration procedures in 
their athlete agent regulations, the two statutes governing athlete agent 
conduct do not adopt a uniform policy relating to arbitration procedures.  
This Note addresses the prior history of state and federal legislation 
pertaining to an athlete agent, including how the UAAA and SPARTA 
regulate athlete agents working with both students and professionals.  This 
Note then analyzes the similarities and differences among the arbitration and 
mediation procedures used by each of the four professional sports leagues’ 
players associations.  It next discusses the successes and failures of both the 
professional leagues’ arbitration methods and other legal literature 
propositions for most effectively dealing with sports agents.  Finally, this 
Note proposes that the most effective processes for dealing with the alleged 
 
 1. Uniform Athlete Agents Act 7(b) (2000).  (The National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) enacted the UAAA to protect educational institutions and 
student-athletes against the conduct of unscrupulous agents.) 
 2. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, S. 1170, 108th Cong. 5(a)(1) (2003).  The 
Federal Trade Commission and the State Attorney General authorize SPARTA to bring a civil action 
against a violating agent.  SPARTA also provides a private cause of action to the educational 
institution against a sports agent for damages caused by a violation of SPARTA.  It also allows for 
common law causes of action including the right of an institution and/or the student athlete to bring a 
tortious interference with contractual relations action against the agent.  See generally John A. Gray, 
Sports Agent’s Liability After Sparta? 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 141 (2006). 
1
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unscrupulous acts of sports agents will result from modifying both the 
UAAA and SPARTA to include a uniform sports agent act and a uniform 
arbitration and mediation section. 
II. THE NECESSITY FOR LAWS GOVERNING ATHLETE AGENTS 
One can tell the story of athlete agent misconduct in six short action 
sentences, and is similar in the reader’s mind to a “flip-book.”3  Athlete 
becomes a juggernaut in his or her respective sport.  Athlete is recruited, or 
more literally befriended by new, wealthy “friends,” who shower the athlete 
with lavish gifts.  Athlete chooses to work with agent, creating a legally 
binding athlete-agent relationship.  After short-lived professional athletic 
success, athlete is knowingly steered in the wrong direction by money and 
power hungry agent.  Agent is not regulated uniformly, and finds a way to 
exploit professional athlete, team, or league.  Process repeats itself in a 
cyclic fashion. 
The sports agent business is a highly competitive and ruthless 
occupation that is rampant with agent misconduct.4  The athlete-agent 
relationship is well-chronicled in three stories.  In the first, Marcus Camby, a 
highly-touted basketball recruit out of high school,5 became embroiled in 
dark side of college athletics when two young, relatively inexperienced 
agents, John Lounsbury and Wesley Spears, gave Camby everything from 
prostitutes to rental cars during his playing years at the University of 
Massachusetts with the hope that he would allow them to represent him 
when he turned pro.6 
Ultimately, after the agents spent an overwhelming sum of money and 
risked criminal punishment, they lost Camby—the number two pick in that 
 
 3. See generally Flipbook History http://www.flipbook.info/history.php (last visited Nov.17, 
2012) (A “flip book” is a book with a series of pictures that vary from one page to the next, so that 
when the pages are turned rapidly, the pictures appear to animate by simulating motion or some 
other change.”). 
 4. Richard T. Karcher, Fundamental Fairness in Union Regulation of Sports Agents, 40 
CONN. L. REV. 355, 357 (2007) (addressing “whether the agent regulations unilaterally adopted by 
the players associations in the four professional sports leagues afford agents a sufficiently fair 
enforcement process.”). 
 5. Marcus Camby is an American professional basketball player who played collegiate 
basketball for the University of Massachusetts Minutemen, and professional basketball for the 
Toronto Raptors, New York Knicks, Denver Nuggets, Los Angeles Clippers, Portland Trailblazers, 
and Houston Rockets.  See Marcus Camby Player Profile, NBA, 
http://www.nba.com/playerfile/marcus_camby/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
 6. Bryan Couch, How Agent Competition and Corruption Affect Sports, 10 SETON HALL J. 
SPORT L. 111, 124–25; see, e.g., Phil Taylor, Tangled Web: Marcus Camby Was Both Victim and 
Villain in His Illicit Dealings with Agents While at UMASS, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 15, 1997, at 
66. 
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year’s NBA draft—to a different agency, Proserv.7  Camby claims that when 
he signed with Proserv, “Spears allegedly threatened to expose an improper 
relationship that he initiated.”8  In addition, out of fear for his life, Camby 
paid $28,500 to Lounsbury, who had tried to build a family-like relationship 
with Camby’s mother.9 
This experience had lasting effects on all members involved: it forced 
the two agents into bankruptcy court and caused them to face criminal 
prosecution, left the UMass basketball program tarnished, and forced the 
school to both return any revenue it earned that year and forfeit all four of its 
NCAA tournament victories because Camby’s involvement made him 
“retroactively ineligible.”10 
In yet another example, the same agency from the previous case, 
Proserv, became entangled in a dispute of its own.  In 1991, Ivan Rodriguez, 
a former Major League Baseball Player,11 signed a one-year terminable at-
will agreement with Speakers of Sport (Speakers) to have the company act 
as his agent.12  In 1995, Rodriguez lost faith in Speakers, and scheduled a 
meeting with Proserv, whose agents led him to believe he was capable of 
earning up to four million dollars a year in endorsements if he signed with 
Proserv.13  Thereafter, Rodriguez left Speakers and signed with Proserv, but 
when he did not earn the money he was promised, he fired Proserv and hired 
a new agent.14 
Speakers filed suit against Proserv in 1997 and alleged that Proserv’s 
actions constituted “tortious interference with prospective business 
relations.”15  The District court granted summary judgment for Proserv, and 
held that Proserv’s “promise” was not fraud or improper conduct, and absent 
evidence demonstrating the contrary by Speakers, was not unreasonable.16  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court, and 
 
 7. Couch, supra note 6, at 125.  Proserv is a Washington D.C. corporation that represents 
professional athletes.  Speakers of Sport v. Proserv, Inc., 1998 WL 473469, at *1 (N.D. Ill.). 
 8. See Couch, supra note 6, at 125. 
 9. Id. at 125–26. 
 10. Id. at 126. 
 11. Ivan Rodriguez is a retired Major League Baseball Player.  He is considered one of the 
best catchers to ever play professional baseball.  See Ivan Rodriguez Profile and Scouting Report, 
ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mlb/player/stats/_/id/2523/ivan-rodriguez (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
 12. Couch, supra note 6, at 116. 
 13. See id.; Speakers of Sport v. Proserv, Inc., 1998 WL 473469, at *1 (N.D. Ill.). 
 14. Couch, supra note 6, at 116–17; Speakers of Sport, 1998 WL 473469, at *2. 
 15. Couch, supra note 6, at 117; Speakers of Sport, 1998 WL 473469, at *1. 
 16. Couch, supra note 6, at 117; Speakers of Sport, 1998 WL 473469, at *5. 
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concluded that Proserv’s actions were nothing more than mere 
competition.17 
As the court heard this case ten years after the enactment of the MLBPA 
Regulations Governing Player Agents, the court cited the Major League 
Baseball rule “forbidding players’ agents to compete by means of 
misrepresentations.”18  The regulations outlined in § 4(L), “Relations 
Among Player Agents, Applicants, and their Employees and Business 
Associates,” establish the rules that an agent must abide by in dealing with 
another agent.19 
Finally, in United States v. Walters, the defendants, Norby Walters and 
Lloyd Bloom, business agents for entertainment and sports figures in the 
1980s, allegedly contracted to represent undergraduate student-athletes who 
were still competing in intercollegiate athletics.20  The defendants set up the 
contracts so that the students were not officially signed until their college 
eligibility expired.21  The defendants not only offered numerous gifts to the 
student-athletes, but also threatened them with physical harm in order to 
control them.22  On one occasion, there was an attack on an associate in his 
office after three former clients of his competitor signed with him.23  A 
number of athletes brought suit against Walters and Bloom for breach of 
contract and physical violence, which occurred when an athlete tried to sign 
with another agent.24 
In 1988, a federal grand jury found Walters and Bloom guilty of seven 
counts, including racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, extortion, 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud.25  This case 
extended white-collar criminal statutes to include the sport agent profession, 
and there are now criminal type penalties outlined in each player association 
agreement.26 
These cases are important beyond their analysis of the law.  First, they 
highlight that sports agent competition has led to crimes of violence.27  
 
 17. Couch, supra note 6, at 117–18. 
 18. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, MLBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING 
PLAYER AGENTS, § 4(L) [hereinafter MLBPA REGULATIONS]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1437 (N.D. Ill. 1989); see Couch, supra note 
6, at 121. 
 21. Couch, supra note 6, at 121. 
 22. Id. at 122. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1438; see Couch, supra note 6, at 122. 
 25. See Couch, supra note 6, at 122. 
 26. See id. at 122–23. 
 27. Id. at 123. 
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Second, they demonstrate the necessity for comprehensive athlete agent 
regulation.28 
III. ATHLETE AGENT DEFINITIONS AND REGULATIONS 
An agent is “one who is authorized to act for or in place of another . . . a 
business representative, whose function is to bring about, modify, accept, 
affect accept performance of, or terminate contractual obligations between 
principal and third persons.”29  More specifically, Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines an agency relationship as “an employment for purpose of 
representation in establishing legal relations between principal and third 
persons.”30  Within the context of sports, an agent is known by a number of 
different names, such as “sports agent, attorney-agent, athlete representative, 
athlete agent, player representative, student-athlete advisor, or player 
agent.”31  These definitions only define an athlete agent role, and do not 
point to how an athlete agent is regulated. 
A. NCAA and Regulation of Athlete Agents 
The National College Athletic Association (NCAA) establishes a clear 
line between intercollegiate and professional competition.32  The provisions 
of the NCAA Bylaws advance the goal of “maintaining a clear line of 
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.”33  In what 
many refer to as the “no agent rule,” the NCAA’s athlete agent regulation 
renders a student-athlete ineligible for intercollegiate competition “if he or 
she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for 
the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that 
sport.”34  Further, all agency contracts are applicable to all sports the student 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 72 (9th ed. 2009). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2009–10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 
§§ 1.2–1.3 (2009), [hereinafter NCAA BYLAWS], available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D110.pdf; R. Alexander Payne, Rebuilding the 
Prevent Defense: Why Unethical Agents Continue to Score and What Can Be Done to Change the 
Game, 13 VAND. J. ENT.  & TECH.  L. 657, 661–62 (2001) (discussing NCAA Regulations in relation 
to agents). 
 33. Id.  § 12.01.2. 
 34. Id. § 12.3.1. 
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athlete participates in.35  This renders the athlete ineligible to participate in 
any future NCAA athletic competition, regardless of sport, unless 
contractual language explicitly states otherwise.36  This same prohibition on 
agency contracts also applies to high school athletes or graduates before 
college enrollment.  For example, anti-remuneration rules prohibit student-
athletes from leveraging their athletic ability “directly or indirectly” for any 
form of pay, promise of future pay, or financial aid not available to the 
student body at-large.37  Barrier regulations also restrict the interactions 
between student-athletes, coaches, agents, and professional sports 
organizations.38 
Under these regulations, student-athletes and their guardians may 
interact with professional teams on their own, including by negotiating a 
professional contract, without loss of eligibility.39  An NCAA member 
institution may also establish a “professional sports counseling panel,” 
which provides an alternative mechanism for providing some traditional 
agent functions, including advising the students about professional 
prospects, helping them secure a personal injury insurance policy, reviewing 
proposed professional contracts, and determining an athlete’s market value.40  
By referring to the receipt of benefits by an “individual,” the NCAA 
explicitly states that the regulations not only apply to enrolled college 
athletes, but also apply to future college recruits still enrolled in high school 
or preparatory institutions.41  The NCAA’s comprehensive and far-reaching 
guidelines delineate the exclusion of an agent until the athlete becomes a 
professional.  NCAA sanctions against institutions provide an effective 
means for achieving agent compliance.42  In doing so, the NCAA makes the 
professional players associations the leading voices in athlete agent 
regulation. 
B. Players Associations and Regulation of Athlete Agents 
Pursuant to § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),43 the 
players associations in the four major professional sports leagues represent 
all of their players “for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at § 13.2.1. 
 38. See id. §§ 12.1.2, 12.3.1.1,13.01.4. 
 39. Id. § 12.2.4.3. 
 40. Id. § 12.3.4. 
 41. Id. § 12.3.1.2(a). 
 42. Id. § 19.5.2.2. 
 43. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
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rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of 
employment.”44  The four players associations—National Football League 
Players Association (NFLPA), National Basketball Players Association 
(NBPA), Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), and 
National Hockey League Players’ Association (NHLPA)—have utilized this 
statutory authority in order to negotiate a level of basic compensation 
guaranteed to every player in the form of minimum salaries, benefits, job 
protections, eligibility for arbitration and free agency, salary caps, rookie 
salary pools, and grievance procedures.45  Each league has relied upon this 
statutory framework that affects players and groups of players differently.  
However, the players associations have each established that it is in the best 
interest of the player to have a representation system that involves the use of 
third party agents.  As a result, each association has delegated to third party 
agents the authority to negotiate individual contracts between players and 
teams.46  Section 9(a) of the NLRA supports the use of third party agents, 
which states that players associations are “entitled to forbid any other person 
or organization from negotiating for its members.”47  Thus, the players 
 
 44. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012) (“Representatives 
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a 
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such 
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, 
or other conditions of employment.”). 
 45. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, PROBLEMS 
324 (2d ed. 1998); see Karcher, supra note 4, at 358. 
 46. NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING 
PLAYER AGENTS 3 (June 1991) (“The NBA and Players Association agree that, notwithstanding the 
foregoing, the Players Association has delegated its authority to individual employees and 
prospective employees . . . to bargain with clubs and to reach agreement upon the provisions of 
Player Contracts.”); NHL & NHLPA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL 
HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION 2 (2013) (“‘Agent 
Certification Program’ means the program by which the NHLPA certifies agents to represent Players 
in individual SPC negotiations with Clubs.”); NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NFLPA REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS 3 (June 2012) (“No person (other than a player representing 
himself) shall be permitted to conduct individual contract negotiations on behalf of a player and/or 
assist in or advise with respect to such negotiations with NFL Clubs. . . .”); MLBPA REGULATIONS, 
supra note 18, § 1(A) (Oct. 2010) (“To afford each Player the opportunity to make better-informed 
decisions about his choice of certified Player Agent . . . and providing Client Maintenance Services 
for players.”). 
 47. Collins v.  National Basketball Players Association, 850 F. Supp. 1468, 1475 (D. Color. 
1991), aff’d, 976 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1992).  “The NBPA is legally entitled to forbid any other 
person or organization from negotiating for its members.  Its right to exclude all others is central to 
the federal labor policy embodied in the NLRA.” Id. (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 175, 180 (1967)). 
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associations have chosen to utilize a third party agent system, whereby 
players compensate their agents for negotiating their final contracts, and the 
players may hire or fire their own agents.48  In granting such rights to the 
player and agent, the association essentially removed itself from the 
bargaining process.  As players associations are non-governmental, private 
agencies, they are not subject to the due process requirements of the 
Constitution.49  To combat agent misconduct that may result from this lack 
of a due process requirement, the players associations each have enacted 
agent regulations that they enforce.  In addition, forty states require each 
agent to register as an athlete agent.50  The registration process involves 
filling out a registration form, paying an initial registration and bi-yearly 
renewal fee, and, if applicable, providing evidence of athlete agent 
registration in a different state for reciprocity.51 
IV. STATE LEGISLATION AND REGULATION OF ATHLETE AGENTS 
Although the role of an athlete agent varies slightly in each respective 
sport, two statutes, the UAAA and SPARTA, attempt to regulate agent 
conduct. 
A.   Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) 
In 1997, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) started development of a model uniform agent 
 
 48. Karcher, supra note 4, at 360–61. 
 49. Id. at 361; see Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he general 
rule of nonreviewability which governs the actions of private associations is subject to exceptions 1) 
where the rules, regulations or judgments of the association are in contravention to the laws of the 
land or in disregard of the charter or bylaws of the association and 2) where the association has 
failed to follow the basic rudiments of due process of law.”); JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, 
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 73 (2d ed. 2004) (“Courts in the United States ordinarily refuse to 
overrule the decisions of sports associations because these decisions do not involve the requisite 
‘state action’ that would subject them to constitutional scrutiny. . . . United States courts have, 
however, become more willing to address claims of procedural fairness as a constitutional 
requirement.”). 
 50. NCAA FAQ on Uniform Athlete Agent Act, NCAA, [hereinafter NCAA FAQ], 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+stories/J
uly+latest+news/FAQ+on+Uniform+Athlete+Agents+Act (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
 51. Athlete Agents, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/statdoc/athlete-
agents.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) (“Athlete agents are governed by Chapter 2051 of the 
Texas Occupations Code and the secretary of state’s administrative rules found in title 1, Chapter 78 
of the Texas Administrative Code.  Before an agent may recruit or solicit an athlete to enter into an 
agent contract, a financial services contract, or a professional sports services contract, an agent must 
obtain a certificate of registration from the secretary of state.”). 
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regulation.52  In 2000, the NCCUSL created the Uniform Athlete Agents Act 
(UAAA) to regulate agents and protect educational institutions and student-
athletes.53  The UAAA sought to establish a uniform scheme of state 
regulation by “standardizing agent registration, reporting, record keeping, 
and punishable misconduct across all adopting states.”54  As of July 2010, 
forty states have adopted the UAAA, and three states operate under non-
UAAA athlete-agent regulatory schemes.55 
The UAAA’s principal regulatory mechanism is a uniform registration 
requirement.56  The UAAA requires “disclosure of potential agent’s (1) 
training, experience, and education; (2) criminal history regarding felonies 
and crimes of moral turpitude; (3) legal history of false or deceptive 
representations; (4) previous denial, suspension, or revocation of licensure in 
any state; and (5) prior sanctions, suspensions, or declarations of student-
athlete ineligibility.”57  “The UAAA further regulates the form of an agency 
contract, and provides for notice to the contracting student-athlete’s 
educational institution.”58  “The UAAA also prohibits certain agent conduct 
and imposes civil and criminal penalties on violators.”59  In addition, the 
UAAA provides criminal penalties if the agent provides “materially false or 
misleading information or make[s] a materially false promise or 
representation with the intent of inducing an agency contract.”60  Under the 
UAAA, agents cannot provide anything of monetary or other value to a 
student athlete or anyone associated with the student athlete.61 
“In addition to criminalizing the above [agent] [mis]conduct, the UAAA 
provides for civil remedies by granting educational institutions a cause of 
 
 52. Payne, supra note 32, at 667. 
 53. UAAA, supra note 1, at Prefatory Note; Payne, supra note 32, at 667–68. 
 54. Payne, supra note 32, at 668. 
 55. NCAA FAQ, supra note 50. 
 56. Payne, supra note 32, at 668. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 668–69 (“Agency contracts must disclose compensation arrangements, the names of 
any unregistered persons receiving compensation due to contract formation, and a description of 
services to be rendered.  Additionally, the UAAA also requires that all agency contracts contain a 
conspicuous provision informing the student- athlete of the possible forfeiture of NCAA eligibility, 
the required notice to his educational institution, and the right to cancel the contract.  Agents may 
not pre- or-post- date any agency contract under penalty of criminal sanctions. . . . Contracts that 
violate the notice and dating requirements are voidable by the student-athlete, who need not 
reimburse the agent.”). 
 59. Id. at 670 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.; see UAAA, supra note 1, § 14. 
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action against an agent or student-athlete for any damages suffered as a 
result of violating the Act. . . .”62  Such damages include “losses and 
expenses incurred [by the institution] from sanctions by the NCAA or 
athletic conference, self-imposed sanctions undertaken in anticipation of and 
to mitigate potential penalties, and associated party costs and [reasonable] 
attorney’s fees.”63  In affected states, the UAAA allows for an official, such 
as the Secretary of State, “to assess a civil penalty of up to $25,000 against 
an agent for violating the Act,” and gives the Secretary of State the right to 
“suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew an agent’s registration for any conduct 
violating the UAAA.”64  The UAAA was fashioned to apply to all athlete 
agents who “enter[] into an agency contract with a student-athlete or, 
directly or indirectly, recruit[] or solicit[] a student-athlete to enter into an 
agency contract.”65  Thus, the intention of the UAAA is to apply a uniform 
set of guidelines for all agents, regardless of whether the individual is a 
student or professional athlete.  Although the UAAA may appear to be all-
inclusive, it is missing one vital section included in all four professional 
sports leagues players associations regulations: a uniform set of arbitration 
procedures for resolving disputes. 
B. Federal Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA) 
In 2004, Congress enacted the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust 
Act (SPARTA), the only federal statute that regulates sports agents.66  
Modeled after the UAAA, SPARTA was intended “to protect educational 
institutions and student-athletes from agent malfeasance.”67  “Congress’ 
primary goal in passing SPARTA was to deter agents from offering 
improper inducements and misleading information to student-athletes, and to 
discourage student-athletes from accepting such inducements.”68. SPARTA 
also “prohibits agents from directly or indirectly recruiting or soliciting a 
student-athlete’s entry into an agency contract [through] false or misleading 
information, . . . or providing anything of value to a student-athlete” or 
 
 62. Payne, supra note 32, at 670; see UAAA, supra note 1, § 16. 
 63. Payne, supra note 32, at 670. 
 64. Id.  “The UAAA designates the Secretary of State as the default enforcement officer; 
however, states may designate the state officer of their choosing as the primary enforcer when 
adopting the Act.”   Id. at 670 n.107.  “Again, $25,000 is the default penalty provided by the UAAA, 
but a state may elect to use whatever fine it decides when enacting the Act.”  Id. at 670 n.108. 
 65. UAAA, supra note 1, § 2(2). 
 66. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, H.R. 361, 108th Cong. § 5(a)(1) (2004). 
 67. Payne, supra note 32, at 671; see Darren Heitner, Duties of Sports Agents to Athletes and 
Statutory Regulation Thereof, 7 DARTMOUTH L.J. 246, 246–47 (2009). 
 68. Payne, supra note 32, at 671. 
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anyone associated with the athlete.69  SPARTA encourages states to adopt 
the UAAA for such purposes although SPARTA does not have a uniform 
registration system.70 
“SPARTA also establishes a system of sanctions for deceptive acts or 
practices [by an agent] and grants enforcement powers to the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).”71 The statute grants the FTC the right to “issue 
injunctions or impose monetary penalties of up to $16,000 for each 
SPARTA violation.”72  Further, the statute authorizes state attorneys general 
to bring civil actions in federal court on behalf of a state if a SPARTA 
violation has adverse effects on the interests of a state’s residents.73  
“SPARTA also provides educational institutions a federal cause of action 
against agents and student-athletes if such violations result” in an expense to 
the educational institution.74 
C. Non-Statute Based Regulation of Sports Agents 
The language above indicates that the UAAA and SPARTA both serve 
to protect professional athletes, student-athletes, professional teams, and 
educational institutions against “harmful acts by unscrupulous sports 
agents.”75  Although both the state-regulated agent regulations and SPARTA 
specifically define the activities prohibited by agents, they do not do enough 
to deter unscrupulous conduct.76  SPARTA, for example, only addresses 
agents’ activity involving student-athletes, leaving states and professional 
sports league rules and regulations to monitor professional athlete agent 
 
 69. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 7802(a)(1) (2012). 
 70. Payne, supra note 32, at 671; 15 U.S.C. § 7807 (2012) (“It is the sense of Congress that 
States should enact the Uniform Athlete Agents Act of 2000 drafted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to protect student athletes and the integrity of amateur 
sports from unscrupulous sports agents.”). 
 71. Payne, supra note 32, at 671; 15 U.S.C. § 7803 (2012) (“The FTC is empowered to 
enforce violations of SPARTA as an unfair deceptive trade practice if all applicable sections of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006), were incorporated into SPARTA.”). 
 72. Payne, supra note 32, at 671. 
 73. Payne, supra note 32, at 671;15 U.S.C. § 7804(a) (2012) 
 74. Payne, supra note 32, at 671; 15 U.S.C § 7805(b) (2012). 
 75. See Heitner, supra note 67, at 246. 
 76. Id. at 255. 
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activity.77  There is no vigorous enforcement of the statutes, which makes 
them under-inclusive.78 
While the “Big Four,” the National Basketball League (NBA), National 
Football League (NFL), National Hockey League (NHL), and Major League 
Baseball (MLB) have players associations that regulate sports agents in their 
respective sports, 79 not all professional athletes play one of these sports. For 
example, athletes who are professional bowlers or golfers do not have a 
union or players’ association that makes certain that an agent has a clean 
criminal record, or prevent a sports agents from engaging in activities that 
could create conflicts of interest.80  SPARTA and the UAAA do not apply to 
professional bowlers and golfers who are not student-athletes.81  Instead, 
bowling agents are simply bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which are too broad and do not provide for enforcement of these regulations 
of the illegal acts of agents.82 
Sports agents, whether employed by a corporation or serving as sole 
practitioners, must register with, and be certified by, any state in which they 
have established minimum contacts.83  This is true in both a state where a 
sports agent wishes to contact student-athletes and a state in which the sports 
agent resides, because once an athlete no longer has NCAA eligibility, 
SPARTA and the UAAA become inapplicable to athletes, and an agent may 
contact any non-eligible student-athlete at will.  Further, even though the 
UAAA creates a duty of disclosure, it does not address the resolution 
methods for disputes dealing with student athletes or professional athletes.84  
Because the Federal Trade Commission has broad-reaching powers for 
enforcement of SPARTA, without any uniform arbitration or mediation 
methods, a uniform method of dispute resolution for athlete agents still does 
not exist.  Additionally, without such processes, it agents may be held 
accountable for their actions in one of the “Big Four” leagues, for example, 
but the agent still has the opportunity to exploit other professional athletes in 
other sports. 
This Note attempts to address the shortcomings of the current legislation 
by suggesting a uniform system of conflict resolution to help regulate the 
unscrupulous agent on both the student and professional athlete levels.  This 
 
 77. Id. at 255–56. 
 78. Id. at 255. 
 79. Id. at 256. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Payne, supra note 32, at 668; see UAAA, supra note 1, § 7(b). 
 84. See Heitner, supra note 67, at 252. 
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Note further proposes to create a uniform sports agent act with a dispute 
resolution section through an amalgamation of the most effective procedures 
used by the four major professional sports leagues.  There should be a 
proposal to amend both the UAAA and SPARTA.  This uniform method of 
dispute resolution will hold agents accountable for unscrupulous actions in 
any sport they are licensed in, so that agents cannot take advantage of 
professional league differences in athlete agent rules or in a lack thereof.85 
V. WHY RELY ON FOUR PROFESSIONAL LEAGUES FOR MOST EFFECTIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Before analyzing the effectiveness of the four major professional sports 
leagues arbitration sections, it is important to establish why these four 
agreements should serve as the benchmark for the new dispute resolution 
section of the UAAA and SPARTA.  Utilizing recent data on professional 
sports yearly revenue, the National Basketball League, National Football 
League, National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball are the top 
four grossing professional leagues in the United States, totaling $26 billion.86  
The four leagues also represent the four highest average salaries and four 
largest salary caps.  These statistics demonstrate the enormous role these 
four professional sports leagues have on the agent industry.  While an agent 
can  represent a player from any professional sport, the economic 
significance the four major sports leagues play in professional sports makes 
the four players associations the strongest benchmark for analysis. 
More importantly, the “Big Four” each include a specific set of agent 
regulations, which have a three-stage process.  In addition, there are roughly 
120 NFL agencies, 70 MLB agencies, 80 NBA agencies, and 18 NHL 
agencies, in comparison to only 13 professional soccer agencies, 15 
professional golf agencies, 10 professional tennis agencies, 4 professional 
softball agencies, and 5 professional volleyball agencies.87  The large 
discrepancy between the number of agencies by sport demonstrates why 
 
 85. For example, in the case of professional bowling, there is a Professional Bowling 
Association (PBA), but there are no guidelines for athlete agents. 
 86. Professional Sports Average Salary/Revenue/Salary Cap, STATISTIC BRAIN, 
http://www.statisticbrain.com/professional-sports-average-salary-revenue-salary-cap/ (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2012). 
 87. Agencies by Sport, SPORTS AGENT BLOG, 
http://www.sportsagentblog.com/agencies/agencies-by-sport/ (lastLast visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
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relying on the “Big Four” player-agent regulations will provide the strongest 
dispute resolution rules. 
VI. PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN PROFESSIONAL 
SPORTS 
Stage One: “The agent certification process, and the enactment of 
regulations that affect all agents and prospective agents.”88 
Stage Two: “The union’s investigatory process of an individual agent it 
suspects of violating its regulations, the factual determinations made by the 
union, and the union’s decision to discipline an agent including the 
disciplinary sanction imposed by the union.”89 
Stage Three: “The dispute resolution process of claims by the union 
against an individual agent for alleged violations, including the agent’s 
ability to appeal the union’s determination or to have the union’s 
determination reviewed by a neutral arbiter.”90 
All of the four professional sports leagues fulfill Stage One and provide 
a certification process for registering and certifying an athlete agent.91  Also, 
all leagues outline both a union investigatory process if an individual agent 
is suspected of violating its regulations as well as a resulting set of 
procedures for dispute resolution.  While each player’s association may have 
legitimate and specific interests regarding their respective sport in 
determining collective bargaining requirements, the role of an athlete agent 
remains nearly identical in all sports: the agent acts as the representative for 
the individual player in contract negotiations with teams.92 
A. Stage One: Regulation and Certification Process 
In order for an agent to become certified to represent an individual 
player and negotiate with the respective team, the players association must 
first certify the agent.  Pursuant to NLRA 9(a), the collective bargaining 
agreements designated the players associations as the “exclusive collective 
bargaining representatives of person[s] who are employed” in each 
 
 88. See Karcher, supra note 4, at 362. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, §§ B-E; NFLPA 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS,supra note 46, §2; NHLPA COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, §6.4; MLBPA REGULATIONS , supra note 46, §4. 
 92. See Karcher, supra note 4, at 363. 
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respective sport.93  Each players association expressly includes the scope of 
regulation, requirements for certification, grounds for denial of certification, 
and an appeal process for denial of certification of agents.94  Initial 
certification may include submitting an application to the players 
association, which includes education experience, prior work experience, 
and financial and other personal information.95 
Each players association also includes procedural standards of conduct 
for agents.  These “unions have also established, unilaterally, regulations 
that all agents must abide by in order to maintain certification.†.†. .”96  
When an agent submits a signed application to the professional league for 
approval, he is presumed to have consented to all provisions contained 
therein.  The respective players associations can and have amended these 
regulations, and the agent must both be aware of and consent to all 
provisions contained in submitting an application for certification.97 
In balancing the interests of NLRA § 9(a) and the players associations’ 
agent regulations, the agent conduct rules have proved successful because 
the regulations and certification requirements tip the balance of agent-union 
power in favor of the union.  First, the interest of the players associations is 
compelling because it gives the union a legitimate interest in making sure 
the agents maintain a high level of competency, do not charge excessive fees 
to players, and do not violate fiduciary duties owed to players.98  The 
associations’ interest under § 9(a) is analogous to a state’s police power.  In 
certain occupations where the state requires a license as a prerequisite to 
practicing within state boundaries, the state has a legitimate interest in 
monitoring and regulating the actions of the licensees.99  Moreover, licensing 
laws are deemed within the state’s police power where: 
[(1)] the licensing law extends the public trust only to those with proven qualifications,  
[(2)] the licensing law protects the public from incompetence and dishonesty in those 
who provide the licensed services,  
 
 93. See, e.g., NBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 46, at 3 (“The NBA recognizes the Players 
Association as the exclusive bargaining representatives of persons who are employed by NBA 
members as professional basketball players.”). 
 94. See, e.g., MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 46, § 7(B). 
 95. See, e.g., NBPA Agent Certification Application. 
 96. See Karcher, supra note 4, at 363; see David Lawrence Dunn, Regulation of Sports 
Agents: Since at First It Hasn’t Succeeded, Try Federal Legislation, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1043-
44 (1988). 
 97. See, e.g., NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 46 (“As amended through June 2012”). 
 98. Karcher, supra note 4, at 364. 
 99. Id. 
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[(3)] in the law’s absence, the likelihood of fraud or other injuries would greatly increase,  
[(4)] the activity or profession sought to be regulated is often associated with criminal 
activity, or [(5)] the law protects the health and safety of the general public from 
unqualified practitioners.100 
These same goals are at play when a union protects its players’ interests 
by regulating agents.  In this same regard, the interests of agents in all 
professional sports, whether with a union or not, should be addressed by the 
UAAA.  A component of the union’s interest under § 9(a) that makes this 
uniform interest compelling is the “nexus that exists between the union’s 
interest and all of its player-members collectively.”101  The players 
associations role in regulating and certifying agents is in some ways aligned 
with the union’s role in negotiating benefits on behalf of all player members 
in collective bargaining.  Courts have recognized the players associations 
interest in the antitrust arena in claims by agents against unions 
unsuccessfully alleging that agent regulations constitute an illegal restraint 
on trade. 
In H.A. Artists & Associates v. Actors’ Equity Association, the theatrical 
agents sued the actors union, alleging that the union’s system for franchising 
agents violated the Sherman Act.102  The United States Supreme Court held 
that, “labor unions acting in their own self-interest and not in combination 
with nonlabor groups”—for example, by enacting regulations that govern 
agents—are statutorily exempt from the antitrust laws.  “H.A. Artists 
supports the union’s interest under § 9(a) in the enactment of agent 
regulations and the agent certification process.”  But, it was not until Collins 
v. National Basketball Players Association,103 ten years after H.A. Artists, 
that the court expansively addressed the tension between labor and anti-trust 
law.  In Collins, a former agent brought action against the union because the 
National Basketball Players Association denied him certification.104  The 
agent claimed the NBPA’s action to create a “group boycott against him 
constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act by restraining him from 
representing individual players in salary negotiations with their teams,” and 
was not justified for denying re-certification.105  The federal district court 
held the NBPA was immune from antitrust claims pursuant to the statutory 
labor exemption under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.  When the 
 
 100. Id.; see 51. AM. JUR. 2D Licenses & Permits § 11 (2000) (“As a justification for a licensing 
requirement as a proper exercise of the police power, the courts generally require a showing that the 
requirement at least tends to promote the public health, morals, safety, or welfare.”). 
 101. Karcher, supra note 4, at 364. 
 102. H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S.  704, 704 (1981). 
 103. Collins, supra note 47, at 1474. 
 104. Id. at 1473. 
 105. Id. at 1474. 
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unions’ activities are in the “union’s legitimate self interest and [are] not 
undertaken in combination with an employer, business or non labor group to 
restrain competition or control prices in the employer’s or business group’s 
product market.”106  The court also recognized the union’s legitimate 
interests in enacting agent regulations. 
The NBPA regulatory program fulfills legitimate union purposes and was the result of 
legitimate concerns: it protects the player wage scale by eliminating percentage fees 
where the agent does not achieve a result better than the collectively bargained minimum; 
it keeps agent fees generally to a reasonable and uniform level, prevents unlawful 
kickbacks, bribes, and fiduciary violations and protects the NBPA’s interest in assuring 
that its role in representing professional basketball players is properly carried out.107 
These cases demonstrate the union’s legitimate interest in “mandatory 
certification process[es] and the enactment of [such] regulations by the 
players associations.”  The certification requirements are conditions that 
must be met by all agents that seek to represent players, and “do not, on their 
face, single out or give preference to one [ ] agent over another.”108. This 
same analogy can again be drawn to state occupational licensing 
requirements in that a state licensing statute does not violate due process 
guarantees if it “clearly and precisely delineates the regulated activity, the 
method and procedure for obtaining a license and the specific grounds upon 
which a license may be denied, as that it is sufficiently clear to allow an 
applicant to reasonably understand what conduct is proscribed by the 
statute.”109  In the context of state licensing statutes, due process 
requirements are violated “only where the legislation is so unreasonable or 
extravagant as to arbitrarily and unnecessarily interfere with, or destroy, 
personal or property rights.”110 
In summary, these cases illustrate that the interest of the union 
outweighs the interest of the agent.  In establishing a uniform set of dispute 
resolution procedures under the UAAA, the state would not be infringing in 
any way on the due process rights of an agent.  The new procedures would 
instead provide a state-wide, and ultimately a federal statute enforcement 
process whereby the agents are held accountable for any acts of malfeasance 
within the specific state in which they are held accountable.  In registering 
 
 106. Id. at 1477. 
 107. Id. at 1477. 
 108. See Karcher, supra note 4, at 366. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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and certifying oneself as an athlete agent within a state, the individual is 
presumed accountable under UAAA adopted state law. 
B. Stage Two: Investigation and Discipline 
Once the union has determined an agent is subject to disciplinary action 
for violating its regulations, a committee formed by the union, or the union 
itself, issues a complaint or notice to the agent specifically setting forth the 
action or conduct that gives rise to the complaint.111  In the National 
Basketball Players Association (NBPA), the Committee on Agent 
Regulation, which consists of the NBPA’s Officers assisted by outside legal 
counsel, are responsible for both receiving and acting upon application for 
certification and serving as the Disciplinary Committee.112  In this latter 
capacity, the NBPA has the “authority and responsibility of initiating, and 
then presenting disciplinary cases against player agents who engage in 
prohibited conduct as defined in Section 3, B(a-q).”113  The Committee also 
has the assistance of the same outside legal counsel used for certification of 
applications.114  In contrast, in the National Football League Player’s 
Association (NFLPA), the President of the NFLPA appoints a three to five 
person Committee on Agent Regulations and Discipline, often referred to as 
“CARD,” or “the Committee,” which is responsible for prosecuting 
disciplinary procedures against Contract Advisors who violate such 
regulations.115  The NFLPA specifies that the makeup of the Committee 
consists of active or retired NFL players chosen at the President’s 
discretion.116  Additionally, the General Counsel of the NFLPA serves as a 
non-voting advisor on the Committee.117  The National Hockey League 
Player’s Association (NHLPA) and Major League Baseball Players 
Association (MLBPA)  are not specific in defining a disciplinary committee 
and instead submit all grievances among players, agents, and applicants to 
the player’s association’s main office.118  Under these players’ associations’ 
 
 111. NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, §6(B). 
 112. Id. at § 1, § 5, & § 6. 
 113. Id. at § 6. 
 114. Id. at § 6. 
 115. NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, §6(A). 
 116.  Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article 17; MLBPA 
REGULATIONS, supra note 18 (as amended effective October 1, 2010), § 7 [hereinafter MLBPA 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYERS AGENTS]. 
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regulations, the agent is not afforded an opportunity to be heard by the union 
before the complaint is issued.119 
Each players association’s regulations lists prohibited conduct with 
varying specificity.  For example, the MLBPA lists three types of disputes: 
those between Players and Player Agents or Applicants, those relating to 
representation and recruitment among Player Agents or Applicants, and any 
appeals by a Player Agent in respect to certification or discipline.120  
However, the NFLPA, in Section 5,121 lists six different possible disputes, 
establishing a broader sweep of disputes between an agent and player. Each 
of the four leagues utilizes a similar chronological process for the 
investigation and discipline process.  A disciplinary process begins with the 
filing of a written complaint against the agent specifying the complaint again 
the agent.  The NBPA and NFLPA have regulations that are more 
comprehensive and require that: 
A complaint must be filed by the Committee within six (6) months from the date of the 
occurrence which gave rise to the complaint, or within six (6) months from the date on 
which the information sufficient to create reasonable cause became known or reasonably 
should have become known to the Committee, whichever is later.122 
The agent against whom the complaint has been filed is then given ten 
(10) (NHLPA), twenty (20) (NBPA and NFLPA), or thirty (30) (MLBPA) 
days to file and serve a written answer to the party who filed the initial 
grievance.123  The answer must admit or deny the facts alleged in the 
grievance and set forth reasons why the grievance should be denied.124  
Within an identified number of days after receiving the answer, either the 
players associations or the committee informs the agent in writing of the 
 
 119. See Karcher, supra note 4, at 370. 
 120. MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 18, § 7. 
 121. NFLPA AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, § 5. 
 122. NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, § 6(b); See NFLPA 
AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, § 5(b). 
 123. NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article17.3(b); NBPA 
AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, § 6(c); NFLPA AGENT 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, § 5(c); MLBPA REGULATIONS , 
supra note 46, § 7(A)(3). 
 124. MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 18, § 7(A)(1)(a-b); NFLPA AGENT REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, § 5(c); NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING 
PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, § 5(b); NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra 
note 46, § 17.3(c). 
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disciplinary action proposed by the union.125  The players’ associations have 
the discretion to propose any number of sanctions, which may include but 
are not limited to: “a formal letter of reprimand, suspension or revocation of 
an agent’s license, and imposition of a fine.”126  The agent against whom the 
complaint has been filed can also appeal the decision of the committee.127  In 
the event that the grievance is not resolved by the parties, each of the four 
players’ associations’ regulations grant the aggrieved party the right to 
appeal the union’s disciplinary action to arbitration, the exclusive method for 
dispute resolution provided. 
Before addressing the arbitration procedures used by the four players 
associations, it is critical to point out the compelling interest surrounding an 
agent’s disciplinary process.  First, a players’ association or committee’s 
interpretation of its regulations regarding prohibited agent conduct could 
result in suspension, which could substantially affect the livelihood of the 
agent and his freedom to practice his professional occupation.128  In  
Loudermill,129 the Supreme Court recognized the significance of this interest 
in the context of public employment: 
The significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid.  We 
have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood. 
(citations omitted)  While a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will 
take some time and is likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under 
which he left his previous job.130 
The concerns stated above are equally applicable to the suspension or 
revocation of an agent’s license.  Unlike a fired employee who may typically 
find work elsewhere, an agent who is subject to punishment is precluded 
from working in that particular industry, making the harm even more 
substantial.131  Although unions have an implied obligation of good faith in 
the interpretation of its rules and regulations, courts generally do not 
question the merits of the players’ associations’ interpretations and 
 
 125. NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, § 6(d); NFLPA 
AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, § 6(d); NHLPA 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article 17.3(c); MLBPA REGULATIONS, 
supra note 18 § 7(a)(3). 
 126. See Karcher, supra note 4 at 368. 
 127. See, e.g., NFLPA AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 
46, § 6(e) (“The Contract advisor against whom a complaint has been filed under this section may 
appeal the Committee on Agent Regulation and Discipline’s proposed disciplinary action to the 
outside Arbitrator by filing a written Notice of Appeal with the Arbitrator within twenty (20) days 
following the Contract Advisor’s receipt of notification of the proposed disciplinary action.”) 
 128. See Karcher, supra note 4, at 372; Crouch v. NASCAR, 845 F.2d 397, 399 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 129. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
 130. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543. 
 131. Karcher, supra note 4, at 372-73. 
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enforcement decisions.132  However, a player-agent who is no longer 
allowed to participate in a specific professional sport is able to apply and 
participate as a player-agent in other professional sports.  This highlights the 
necessity for explicit disciplinary procedures in the UAAA, and SPARTA, 
and the importance of a national check on the union’s reign.  An agent 
should have the opportunity to present his case before he is reinstated into 
either the sport he once practiced in or a different professional sport.133 
C. Stage Three: Dispute Resolution and Arbitration 
Alternative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration, provide a 
cost-efficient and swift process for the resolution of a dispute.  Arbitration is 
currently the preferred means for resolving sports-related disputes.134  All 
four players’ associations contain substantially similar provisions regarding 
the conduct of arbitration hearings in which the agent can appeal the union’s 
disciplinary action.  The players’ association or committee has the burden of 
proving the allegations of its complaint.  The two sides may each appear 
with counsel or a representative of their choosing.  Each side has a full 
opportunity to present, through testimony or otherwise, all evidence 
pertaining to the action or conduct of the agent that is prohibited by the 
players’ association regulations.  The hearings are conducted in accordance 
with the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.135  There is neither a right to discovery nor a right to file pre-
hearing or post-hearing briefs.  The arbitration process is the exclusive 
method of challenging any disciplinary action and the decision of the 
arbitrator is final and binding on all parties.136 
 
 132. See Crouch, supra note 6, at 403 (concluding that the district court should have deferred to 
NASCAR’s interpretation of its own rules.). 
 133. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 at 544 (establishing a check on player agents who have acted 
improperly in other professional sports came from “the fact that the Commission saw fit to reinstate 
Donnelly suggests that error might have been avoided had he been provided an opportunity to make 
his case to the Board.  As for Loudermill, given the Commission’s ruling we cannot say that the 
discharge was mistaken.”). 
 134. See Karcher, supra note 4, at 380. 
 135. See Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (as 
amended and effective on January 1, 1996). 
 136. NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, § 5(D); NFLPA 
AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, § 6(G); NHLPA 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article17.13; MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra 
note 46, § 7(B)(6-15). 
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While the players’ associations offer similar processes for arbitration, 
they differ in one very significant respect in regards to their arbitration 
procedures: the process the unions utilize for the selection of the arbitrator.  
Under the MLBPA Regulations, the arbitrator is selected through a process 
in which the union and agent mutually agree.  The MLBPA then selects five 
“professional and skilled labor arbitrators.”137  “Within seven days of the 
receipt of the list, the parties select an arbitrator by alternatively striking 
names off the list until only one name remains.” The MLBPA uses a coin 
flip system for deciding which party strikes the first name.138  This appears 
to be a very fair method as both the agent and the MLBPA jointly request a 
list of arbitrators  and then each have a fifty percent chance of striking the 
first name until one remains.  Because both parties are involved throughout 
each step of the process, there is no bias towards one side. 
Under the NHLPA agent regulation, the union unilaterally selects a 
panel of three arbitrators, and the arbitrator assigned to hear the appeal is 
determined on a rotation basis.  In this case, the NHLPA appoints a panel of 
three “skilled, experienced and impartial persons to serve as single 
Arbitrators for a one year term, which is automatically renewed unless the 
member resigns or is discharged by the NHLPA.139  The arbitrator that is 
next in the rotation will hear the grievance, pursuant to Section 5, unless that 
arbitrator has already heard a previous case involving the same agent and 
factual circumstances that are the subject of the disciplinary action, in which 
case the next arbitrator in the rotation will hear the appeal.  The arbitrator 
selected must hear the case under the Voluntary Tribunal Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association then in effect.140 
Although this method is slightly different than that of the MLBPA, it 
has proved to be successful for the NHL.  While the NHLPA does not work 
in tandem with the agent in selecting the arbitrators, the fact that the 
arbitrator is appointed for a one year term and can be discharged at any point 
by the NHLPA demonstrates the comprehensive review the NHLPA utilizes 
in selecting each arbitrator.141 
In contrast to the MLBPA and NHLPA selection process regulations, 
the NBPA and NFLPA have the respective players association “select a 
skilled and experienced person to serve as the outside Impartial Arbitrator 
 
 137. MLBPA REGULATIONS §7(B)(7). 
 138. Id. 
 139. NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, § 6(F). 
 140. See Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, supra 
note 135. 
 141. NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article 17.6 
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for all cases arising hereunder.”142  The NFLPA has an additional regulation 
in which the Committee on Agent Regulation and Discipline “may, at its 
discretion, appoint two (2) additional arbitrators so as to create a panel of 
three (3) arbitrators to hear cases arising hereunder.”  There is also a 
provision in each of their regulations that states that the fees and expenses of 
the arbitrator shall be borne by the union.143 
Because every league has different rules and guidelines for agent 
activity, it is permissible for the selection of the arbitrator to be determined 
by the sport’s agent regulations.  Although it would likely prove more 
comprehensive if all four leagues had both sides jointly select the 
arbitrator(s), the arbitration methods used in each individual league are 
primarily in place to assist a player with internal manners concerning any 
unscrupulous agent acts. Because such methods have proved successful for 
each league, this Note relies on such methods in developing a federal 
guideline so that all professional sports leagues can employ a similar method 
for monitoring agent activity. 
VII. WHERE THE UAAA AND SPARTA FALL SHORT 
In the 2004 Sports Business Journal article titled “Agents Use Their 
Influence to Help Shape New Labor Agreements,” former interim NFLPA 
Executive Director Richard Berthelsen states, “agents in nearly all respects, 
are like employees of the sports unions themselves. . .[t]hey are agents of the 
union.”144  Although courts have upheld the authority of such unions,145 the 
regulatory systems of the players associations only address two broad 
categories in the agent industry, competence and ethics.  While the different 
leagues have enacted several amendments to their agent regulations that 
demonstrate a renewed commitment to combating illegal agent activity 
 
 142. NFLPA AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, §5(D); 
see also NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYERS AGENTS, supra note 46, §5(C). 
 143.  NFLPA AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, §5(G); 
see also NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYERS AGENTS, supra note 46, §5(E) 
 144. Timothy Davis, Regulating The Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended And Unintended 
Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 817 (2006). 
 145. Id; Davis supra note 144 at 817; see generally Collins v. National Basketball Players 
Association, No. 92-1022, 976 F.2d 740, (D. Colo.  Sept. 21, 1992); White v. National Football 
League, 92 F. Supp. 2d 918 (D. Minn. 2000); Black v. National Football League Players 
Association, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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within their respective sport,146 and more than 40 states have passed the 
UAAA, there still does not exist a uniform sports agent act with a dispute 
resolution guideline within the UAAA147 or SPARTA148 that all leagues can 
utilize as a uniform method of requiring competency, ethics, and 
wrongdoing. 
The UAAA and SPARTA were both instituted to further protect 
professional athletes, student-athletes, professional teams, and educational 
institutions against “harmful acts by unscrupulous sports agents.”149  
Although the UAAA and SPARTA specifically define the activities 
prohibited by agents, SPARTA only refers to athlete agent activity with 
regard to student athletes.  In addition, both statutes do not provide a means 
of dispute resolution following such type of violation by an agent. 
 
 146. See Davis, supra note 144 at 820 (“In 2002, the NFLPA adopted the one-in-three rule.  
NFLPA certified agents are required to negotiate at least one contract during a three-year period in 
order to retain certification.  Agents who failed to comply with the rule may reapply to become 
certified.  An estimated 150 NFLPA certified agents lost their certification since the requirement 
went into effect.”); NFLPA AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, at §2(G); Liz 
Mullen, One-in-Three Rule’s Arrival may Decertify About 150 NFL Agents, SPORTS BUS. J. Sept. 
26-Oct. 2, 2005, at 14. 
 147. (a) An athlete agent, with the intent to induce a student-athlete to enter into an 
agency contract, may not: (1) Give any materially false or misleading information or make a 
materially false promise or representation; (2) Furnish anything of value to a student-athlete 
before the student-athlete enters into the agency contract; or (3) Furnish anything of value to 
any individual other than the student-athlete or another registered athlete agent. (b) An athlete 
agent may not intentionally: (1) Initiate contact with a student-athlete unless registered under 
this [Act]; (2) Refuse or fail to retain or permit inspection of the records required to be retained 
by Section 13; (3) Fail to register when required by Section 4; (4) Provide materially false or 
misleading information in an application for registration or renewal of registration; (5) Predate 
or postdate an agency contract; or (6) Fail to notify a student-athlete before the student-athlete 
signs or otherwise authenticates an agency contract for a particular sport that the signing or 
authentication may make the student-athlete ineligible to participate as a student-athlete in that 
sport. 
Uniform Athlete Agents Act 7(b) (2000). 
 148. The only section of SPARTA that deals with prohibited agent conduct lists the 
following provisions: (a) Conduct Prohibited- It is unlawful for an athlete agent to (1) Directly 
or indirectly recruit or solicit a student athlete to enter into an agency contract, by (A) Giving 
any false or misleading information or making a false promise or representation; or (B) 
Providing anything of value to a student athlete or anyone associated with the student athlete 
before the student athlete enters into an agency contract, including any consideration in the 
form of a loan, or acting in the capacity of a guarantor or co-guarantor for any debt; (2) Enter 
into an agency contract with a student athlete without providing the student athlete with the 
disclosure document described in subsection (b); or (3) Predate or postdate an agency contract. 
Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, S. 1170, 108th Cong. 3(a)(1) (2003). 
 149. Darren Heitner, Duties of Sports Agents to Athletes and Statutory Regulation Thereof, 
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While reasonable deference will be given to established agent 
regulations within the four major leagues, the goals for adding a uniform 
sports agent act with a tailored dispute resolution section are: (1) to create a 
uniform minimum set of standards for all agents in all professional sports; 
(2) to create nationalized, uniform checks on agents in all sports; and (3) to 
provide a repository database for all arbitrators to access in connection with 
their respective sport’s arbitration rules in order to prevent future 
unscrupulous conduct by agents. 
PROPOSED DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION 
In addition to modifying SPARTA so that it addresses professional 
athletes as well as student athletes,150 a draft of the proposed Dispute 
Resolution section with comments as to why the specific sections below 
should be included is listed below.151 
VIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 
A. Introduction 
This new system for regulating agents in all professional sports is based 
upon the intention of the UAAA and SPARTA that these procedures be 
instituted in addition to the arbitration procedures set forth in the athlete 
agent rules or regulations. This new system will be the exclusive method for 
resolving any and all disputes that arise from denying certification to an 
agent or from the interpretation, application, or enforcement of these rules 
and regulations and the resulting fee agreements between the agents and 
individual players.  These procedures will ensure that the UAAA and 
SPARTA will assist in expeditiously resolving allegations of unscrupulous 
acts of agents, as well as disputes traditionally resolved by the existing 
arbitration procedures by the decision maker established herein.152 
Therefore, the provisions of this section shall apply with respect to two 
types of disputes that may arise under these Regulations: (1) if the 
 
 150. In order to properly modify SPARTA, the new bill would replace “student athletes” with 
“student and professional athletes” throughout the federal statute. 
 151. The information below was created through a combination of: NFLPA Agent Regulations 
§ 6; NHLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement §17; NBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents § 
6. 
 152. NFLPA AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 34, § 6(A); 
NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 34, article §17.1; NBPA REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 4, § 6(A). 
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Committee on Agent Regulation denies an Application for Certification and 
the applicant wishes to appeal from that decision; and (2) when a dispute 
arises with respect to the meaning, interpretation or enforcement of a fee 
agreement entered into between player and his or her agent.153 
The next two sections, the filing and answer sections, are modeled 
almost identically to the big four’s filing and answer rules.  The only major 
difference is that the written grievance is furnished to the Federal Trade 
Commission and Attorney General of the state in which the filing occurs.  
Because SPARTA already “makes certain activities of sports agents come 
within the regulations of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),” the FTC is 
rooted as the adjudicative body for dealing with the unscrupulous acts of 
agents.154  In addition, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) was 
passed by Congress “to protect businesses and consumers from unfair 
competition and unjust or deceptive acts in the conduct of business,” making 
the FTC the most effective adjudicative body for monitoring such agent 
actions.155  By providing the FTC with the initial grievance, it allows them to 




The arbitration shall be initiated by the filing of a written grievance 
either by the player, his agent, or the players association.  Any such 
grievance must be filed within thirty days from the date of the occurrence of 
the event upon which the grievance is based, within thirty  days from the 
date on which the facts of the matter become known or reasonably should 
have become known to the grievant, or within thirty  days from the effective 
date of these regulations, whichever date is later.  A player need not be 
under contract of a professional club at the time a grievance arises or at the 
time such grievance is initiated or processed.  A player may initiate a 
grievance against a player agent if he or she: (1) sends the written grievance 
by prepaid certified mail to the player agent’s business address or by 
personal delivery at such address, (2) to the professional league in which the 
agent misconduct pertains to, (3) and furnishes a copy to the Federal Trade 
 
 153. Supra note 139 and discussion. 
 154. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, § 1170, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7803(b) (West). 
 155. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, supra note 154, § 1170. 
 156. Supra note 154, § 1170. 
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Commission (FTC)157 and State Attorney General within which the 
unscrupulous act occurred.158  The written grievance shall set forth in simple, 
concise, and direct terms the facts and circumstances giving rise to the 
grievance and the relief sought.159 
C. Answer 
The party against whom a grievance is filed (“the Respondent”) shall 
answer the grievance in writing by certified mail or personal delivery within 
thirty calendar days of receipt of the grievance.  The Answer shall admit or 
deny the facts alleged in the grievance and shall also briefly set forth the 
reasons why the respondent believes the grievance should be denied.  The 
Respondent must also provide a copy of this Answer to the FTC and the 
State’s Attorney General.  Once the Answer is filed, the FTC and State’s 
Attorney General shall promptly provide the Arbitrator with copies of the 
grievance and answer all other relevant documents.  If an Answer is not filed 
within this time limit, the Arbitrator, in his discretion, may issue an order 
where appropriate, granting the grievance and the requested relief upon 
satisfactory proof of the claim.160 
Once the grievance is filed, there must be a selection process for the 
arbitrator(s).  As demonstrated above, each of the big four have their own 
process for selecting the arbitrator in an impartial manner.161  In this same 
context, the arbitration selection section will grant the professional league in 
which the agent issue occurs the right to establish their own impartial 
process.  By instituting this on a federal level, the professional league will be 
 
 157. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent agency of the United States 
government established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act.  Its principal mission is to 
promote consumer protection and the elimination and prevention of anti-competitive business 
practices. 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 7803 (2005). 
 159. NFLPA AGENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, at § 
6(B); NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article 17.2; NBPA 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENT, § 6(B); MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 46, § 
7(A)(1)-(A)(2). 
 160. NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, at § 6(C); 
NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article 17.3; NBPA REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, § 6(C); MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 46, § 
7(A)(3). 
 161. NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 46, § 6(F); NHLPA 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article 17.6, MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra 
note 46, § 7(A)(16). 
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required to have arbitrators already selected to help facilitate the process ifa 
grievance is filed. 
D. Arbitrator Selection 
The respective professional league shall use their discretion, whether 
through player agent rules and regulations, or a standardized process, to 
select an experienced arbitrator(s) to serve as the outside impartial 
arbitrator(s) for the cases arising hereunder.162 
The arbitrator will then hold a hearing.  This section is also modeled 
nearly identically to the big four’s hearing sections because an arbitration 
hearing is typically standardized regardless of the professional sport.163 
E. Hearing 
The arbitrator(s) shall schedule a hearing on the dispute through the 
standardized process used within the professional league.  At such hearings, 
the parties may appear in person or by counsel or other representative.  The 
parties to the dispute will have the right to present, by testimony or 
otherwise, any evidence relevant to the grievance.  Within thirty (30) days 
after the close of the hearing, the Arbitrator(s) shall issue a written award.  
That award shall constitute full, final, and complete resolution of the 
grievance, and will be binding upon the player and player agent involved.  
Given the uniquely internal nature of any such dispute that may be presented 
to the arbitrator, the award issued by the arbitrator shall not be subject to 
judicial review on any grounds.164 
The next section is the most critical and novel part of the proposed 
statute.  It requires every arbitrator in every sport, to submit a description of 
the claim and any remedy the arbitration committee proposes to the FTC, 
which will in turn create and maintain a document database of all agent 
arbitration cases.  Every arbitrator must include the contents of the database 
in their deliberative process to formulate the most effective decision.  This 
database will make it impossible for an agent who commits an unscrupulous 
act to exploit a different professional league because his or her prior record 
will already be filed with the FTC.  This concept has already proven to be 
effective in medical practice; the United States Department of Health and 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article 17.9; NBPA 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, § 6(F). 
 164. NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article 17.9; NBPA 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, § 6(F). 
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Human Services has created both the National Practioner Data Bank165 and 
the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank,166 which are confidential 
information clearinghouses created to improve health care quality, protect 
the public, and reduce health care fraud and abuse in the United States.167  
This database will be cost effective, in that the main costs are in the 
development of the database, and will hold all agents accountable in every 
state and every professional league. 
F. Proposed Disciplinary Action: Database of Agent Cases 
Within thirty  days after the receipt of the Answer, the Arbitrator(s) shall 
inform the player agent, FTC, and State’s Attorney General in writing (by 
prepaid certified mail) of the nature of the discipline and any remedies the 
Committee imposes.  Regardless of which professional sport, every agent 
arbitration decision will be placed in the FTC repository database titled 
“National Database for the Unscrupulous Acts of Agents.”  Before 
proposing disciplinary action, the arbitrator is required to access this 
database in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the player 
agent’s past and present wrongdoings.168 
The remaining two sections, “Time Limits; Cost” and “Amendment” are 
also almost identical to the big four.169  The Amendment portion below 
grants the FTC the right to amend any section if necessary. 
G. Time Limits; Cost 
Each of the time limits set forth in this section may be extended by 
mutual written agreement between the parties involved and the arbitrator(s).  
The fees and expenses of the arbitrators will be paid for by the professional 
league.  Each party will bear the costs of its own witness, counsel, etc.170 
 
 165. Title IV of Public Law 99-660; Section 1921 of the Social Security Act. 
 166. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 221(a), P. L.  104-91. 
 167. See The National Practitioner Dad Bank., available at http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov 
(last visited January 31, 2013). 
 168. NFLPA Agent Regulations, § 6(D); NBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents § 6(D). 
 169. NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, supra note 168, at §6(H); 
NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 46, article 17.14-17.15; NBPA 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGREEMENTS, supra note 46, at § 6(G); MLBPA 
REGULATIONS, supra note 46, at § 7(A)(17). 
 170. Id. 
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H. Amendment 
These regulations may be amended periodically by the action of the 
FTC.171 
IX. PROPOSED CLAUSES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR UAAA AND SPARTA: 
WHY AN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION APPROACH IS A NECESSITY 
The proposed statute above is a necessary amendment to the UAAA and 
SPARTA statutes for a number of reasons.  Although the four major 
professional leagues already have a dispute resolution section, a review of 
prior scholastic and academic criticism of the UAAA and SPARTA illustrate 
why this section will be necessary in both statutes.  This note analyzes 
previous proposals of amendments to the dispute resolution proceeding, 
determines what is and is not effective about them, and suggests a 
comprehensive and effective dispute resolution section. 
A. Sports Law Association: “Uniform Sports Agent Act” 
In 1997, the Sports Law Association coordinated a drafting committee 
and presented their draft of the “Uniform Sports Agents Act” at the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.172  This proved to be 
a precursor to the UAAA and ultimately the federal statute SPARTA.  
Despite the suggestion for uniform state legislation and its advantages, the 
draft failed to lobby for a uniform dispute resolution act.173  Although 
SPARTA was supposed to provide federal regulations that the UAAA was 
unable to accomplish, Eric Willenbacher concluded that SPARTA was not 
successful.174  Willenbacher argues “the deterrents, i.e., the potential civil 
and criminal penalties under SPARTA, will not deter unscrupulous 
agents.”175  While Willenbacher presents no systematic, empirical data to 
support this judgment, he argues that he believes there is too large a 
 
 171. NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS, supra note 46, at § 7. 
 172. See Uniform Sports Agents Act (Draft Only), National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (1997), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/athlete_agents/aa597.pdf. 
 173. See generally Kenneth L. Shropshire, Comment, Sports Agents, Role Models and Race-
Consciousness, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 267, 274 (1996) (exploring the role of the African-American 
sports agent in representing African-American athletes, and concluding that race-consciousness 
should be an important factor in choosing an agent.). 
 174. Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal and State Efforts Do 
not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National Licensing System May Cure the 
Problem, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1225, 1235 (2004). 
 175. Willenbacher, supra note 174, at 1226. 
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discrepancy between the monetary gain for agents and minimal federal and 
state administrative fines for unethical and illegal tactics.176  To solve this 
problem, he suggests a national registry of federally licensed  sports agents, 
that can be used to monitor agent activities, including a section that states 
that an agent can be removed from the national registry of agents if he or she 
acts in an unscrupulous manner.177 
The dispute resolution scheme proposed above solves Willenbacher’s 
criticism and suggestion for a national registry.  However, instead of only 
utilizing the registry to add or remove an agent, it would be more effective to 
have a repository where all agent arbitration results are uniformly reported 
so that an agent is held accountable for all prior unscrupulous actions in any 
professional sport.  By making it a requirement for all arbitrators to both 
consult this database before making a decision and update it following the 
decision, the registry will allow no prior illegal or unethical activity to go 
unnoticed.  This will prevent any agent from exploiting another sport after 
becoming subject to a penalty for their previous actions. 
As Willenbacher notes, SPARTA is not silent on the issue of creating 
agent registries and licensing systems, and the UAAA has, “as one of its 
centerpieces, the creation of a state licensing system similar to the one 
proposed in this [Willenbacher’s] Note.178  However, a dispute resolution 
section proves more effective than a national licensing system because it 
creates a more expansive platform of the already existing resolution process.  
As each professional league has its own arbitration processes, this proposal 
would elevate those procedures to a national level through the repository 
database of arbitration cases, which, as mentioned previously in this Note, is 
a primary objective for effectively dealing with the unscrupulous acts of 
agents in professional sports leagues.  In addition, by monitoring arbitration 
through SPARTA by the FTC and through the State’s Attorney General, it 
will provide access on both the state and federal level for monitoring player 
agents.  Further, a submission by the professional league will provide three 
different checks on the system and make it nearly impossible for an agent’s 
acts to go unnoticed. 
 
 176. Willenbacher, supra note 174, at 1243-44. 
 177. Willenbacher, supra note 174, at 1249-53. 
 178. See Willenbacher, supra note 174, at 1251; see Uniform Athlete Agents Act § 4, 6, 8 
(2000). 
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B.  SPARTA and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Melissa Steedle Bogad pointed out that SPARTA has a number of 
similarities to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.179  For example, 
Bogad notes that “SPARTA’s rule requiring the agent to disclose that a 
contract will jeopardize the student athlete’s eligibility is merely a 
particularized version of . . . Model Rules 1.4(a)(1) and (4),” which require 
that the lawyer promptly inform her client of decisions that require the 
client’s informed consent, and require that the lawyer promptly respond to 
the requests for information regarding the matter.180  In pointing out such 
similarities, Bogad suggests that SPARTA is no more effective than the 
Model Rules. 
Utilizing both the four professional sports player-agent regulations as a 
guide and Bogad’s statements that SPARTA does not do more than the 
Model Rules, this Note suggests that adding a dispute resolution section will 
create a more effective federal statute for agents.  Similar to Rule 2.4(a) of 
the Model Rules, in which “a lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the 
lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach 
a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them,”181 the 
proposed section will allow an arbitrator to act as the third-party.  Thus, in 
expanding on Bogad’s proposal, this section will create a more 
comprehensive statute because it specifies not only that the arbitrator(s) 
must be selected, but more importantly that all cases, regardless of 
professional sport, are kept in one database as to assist the arbitrator(s) in 
making a well-informed decision. 
C. Oversight Program 
Although Damon Moore was writing specifically about the role of 
agents with regard to the NCAA, his proposal for an oversight program is 
also accomplished through the dispute resolution section.182  Moore 
suggested an oversight program where an “NCAA committee would 
periodically review the inventory and accounts of student-athletes to 
determine whether they are in compliance with NCAA regulations.”183  The 
 
 179. See Melissa Steedle Bogad, Maybe Jerry Maguire Should Have Stuck with Law School: 
How the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act Implements Lawyer-Like Rules for Sports Agents, 
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1896-97 (2006). 
 180. Id. at 1909; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(1), (4) (1983). 
 181. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4(a) (1983). 
 182. Damon Moore, Proposals for Reform to Agent Regulations, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 517, 519 
(2011). 
 183. Moore, supra note 182, at 551. 
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database of dispute resolution cases established in the dispute resolution 
section would accomplish this program’s goals because every arbitrator 
would be required to look through the database of prior agent cases and can 
use an agent’s prior actions to assist them in making the appropriate 
decision. 
D. Committee Creation 
In a closer context to the goals of this Note, R. Alexander Payne 
recently published an article in the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and 
Technology Law, in which he determined “the greatest problems facing the 
UAAA regime are what faced the system it replaced—a lack of uniformity, 
difficulties with compliance, penalties without bite, and apathy towards 
enforcement.”184  Payne established that although the UAAA was not 
effective, it did not need to be rescinded but instead made more 
comprehensive through “a useful monitoring and enforcement supplement to 
federal regulation.” 
In order to achieve this goal, Payne suggested two major revisions to the 
UAAA: “(1) explicit deference to the federal registration and reporting 
schemes and (2) removal of state application fees.”185  However, Payne 
believes that to create a more effective check, he must establish a Sports 
Agent Licensing and Oversight Commission (SALOC) by amending 
SPARTA in order to create a centralized mechanism to: “(1) enforce the 
registration disclosure requirements of the UAAA; (2) established a single 
application process and fee; (3) monitor registered agents; and (4) bring suits 
both criminal and civil, against non-registered agents who violate the 
law.”186  Payne also proposes that Congress should criminalize bad acts of an 
agent or the entering into any agency agreement without a federal license to 
encourage agents to weigh the prospect of liability more seriously.  The 
author also proposes that Congress should require “professional sports teams 
and other entities to verify that the athlete-agents with whom they negotiate 
and contract are federally licensed.”187 
These proposals are achieved through the acceptance of the proposed 
dispute resolution section within the UAAA and SPARTA.  While a new 
 
 184. Payne, see supra note 32, at 683. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 684. 
 187. Id. at 685. 
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committee like SALOC188 could prove to be effective, SPARTA already 
grants the FTC the right to police the unscrupulous acts of player agents.  
Instead of creating an additional committee, which may ultimately generate 
less uniformity, this Note’s proposal for the National Database for the 
Unscrupulous Acts of Agents proves to be a cost effective alternative to the 
formation of a committee.  The FTC will be responsible for building a 
document database and making sure it is updated, but the arbitrators will be 
responsible for checking the database and utilizing the previous cases so as 
to make the best decision.  Thus, the committee essentially places the 
responsibility on the arbitrators to act in a comprehensive fashion when 
making their decision in a particular case. As mentioned above, this concept 
has already proven effective in the medical practice and is cost effective in 
that the main costs are in the development and building of the database. The 
only work that will be needed is to maintain and update the database on a 
yearly basis. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The sports agent industry is a ruthless, competitive world, and a sports 
agent often employs a “whatever it takes”189 mentality to land a client.  If the 
sports agent is not a member of a professional league with a players’ 
association, there are no current guidelines for monitoring the agent’s 
unscrupulous acts.  While athlete-agent laws already exist in forty-one of the 
fifty states, there remains no national uniformity for the dispute resolution of 
such unscrupulous acts.  Thus, even if the professional sport has a players’ 
association with athlete agent guidelines, the UAAA and SPARTA do not 
have a dispute resolution method for preventing an agent from exploiting 
athletes in different sports. 
Both the States’ attempt to regulate this activity through the UAAA and 
Congress’s attempt to regulate this activity through SPARTA demonstrates a 
step in the right direction in protecting individuals from misguided agents.  
However, this uniformity is not comprehensive enough—-adequate dispute 
resolution on a national scale is a necessity in order to deter agents from 
making repeated unethical decisions.  To combat these problems, both the 
states, under the UAAA, and Congress, under SPARTA, should add a 
dispute resolution section in order to create a uniform minimum set of 
standards for all agents in professional sports.  This section will provide a 
repository database for all arbitrators to access in connection with their 
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respective sports’ arbitration rules in order to create a nationalized uniform 
check on agents.  The database will be utilized by arbitrators so that the 
decision is both comprehensive and well informed.  The selection of the 
arbitrator(s) shall be at the discretion of the respective professional league, 
and the decision of the arbitrator(s) shall be final and binding.  It is through 
this approach that Congress will best be able to monitor unscrupulous sports 
agents’ acts on a national scale and deter future acts. 
The “whatever it takes” sports agent mentality must come to a stop.  
Although the prohibition of certain sports agent activities is outlined 
adequately, enforcement provisions, specifically those related to dispute 
resolution, are deficient on a national scale.  By incorporating the proposals 
outlined above, the interested parties will create an environment that 
enhances sports agents’ accountability and forces such individuals to 
relinquish unethical agent activity. 
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